Some Efficiencies in the O-TTPS Accreditation Program

One of the nice things about working with the OTTF and The Open Group TM in developing their O-TTPS Accreditation Program has been the emphasis that the forum members placed on efficiency within the program.

One of the major gripes in the IT assurance community is that we seem to do the same things over and over again.

That costs us precious resources, people, money and time and was pointed out by many of the members of the OTTF.

Mary Ann Davidson of Oracle, as usual, expressed the problem very well: "Doing the same thing twice or more unintentionally usually ends up with worse security as we use scarce resources on duplicative measures."

For developers, how many times do they really have to get their processes checked to see if, for example, they use an automated configuration management system, and that they have implemented access control for it. Such checks are made over and over again if they need to certify products under a variety of assessment programs.

For some of our customers, we have checked this close to a hundred times over the last decade.

Using the above example, the checks are made if a product from the developer needs FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria, O-TTPS assessment, etc., etc. It's both inefficient and expensive for the developers.
These overlaps are prevalent and extend to many of the organizations' processes, not just to configuration management.

Similarly, for mature IA assessment companies like atsec, we find that all of the various programs that we are involved with demand that we have certified management systems. The problem is that there are a variety of standards and a variety of certification programs to choose from.

In atsec's case, this has meant that we have to, across our small company of less than 100 people, to manage, endure and pay for many management system audits; It is a cost of our doing business, but a real pain in the... .

We have:

• ISO/IEC 17025: 2 for NVLAP (don't ask!), BSI, FMV, and by ISCCC;
• Technical competence audits: CMVP, NIAP, GSA, BSI, CSEC, O-TTPS;
• PCI SSC: (not based on international standard);
• ISO 9001 (Customer demand);
• ISO/IEC 27001  (Customer demand);
• and soon to ISO/IEC 17020.

None of the our auditors are allowed to accept the results from the others. Granted, each scheme requires a different technical competence, but our document and record control, HR, training, resource management, corrective and preventive actions, internal audit, calibration, etc. are the same for all of the programs to which we belong.

atsec customers can be assured that our management system is well audited!

.. back to the O-TTPS Accreditation Program: 

The forum saw the chance to try and address this issue: The notion of carefully reusing existing assurance was one of the factors we considered during each stage of developing the new O-TTPS Accreditation Program.

Here are some of the efficiencies that we identified and that the Accreditation Program has implemented:

• The ability for O-TTPS assessors to reuse existing audit reports presented by the developer. These might include, where relevant, ISO 9001, security audits, Common Criteria site visits, etc.
  Note that there are some careful provisions, which are detailed in the Assessment Procedures.
• Currently under development: The provision of mappings, allowing the work done for existing product certifications, such as Common Criteria, to be more easily mapped to the O-TTPS requirements.
• For prospective Recognized Assessor companies and assessors, the ability to accept a variety of existing certifications of management systems and assessor qualifications that address the core skills needed as information assurance (IA) professionals. This allows The Open Group to concentrate only on the additional specialised skills needed for the O-TTPS accreditation program.

Although simple policies, they allow the program to be more efficient, reducing the overhead of unnecessary duplication, meaning that the costs of accreditation are not overburdened. These reduce the costs of assessment, to all parties involved: The Accreditation Authority, the Recognized Assessors and to the Organizations undergoing accreditation.

Not only that, but we can concentrate more on the important issue of integrity in the COTS ICT Supply Chains.

Thank you to the OTTF for living in the real world! :)

~ Fiona Pattinson

- "The Open Group" is a trademark of The Open Group

atsec and supply chain security

Supply chain assurance: mitigate the threats of counterfeit and tainted products, globally. Quite a challenge!

To do that we'd need some of the best subject matter experts in the world.

Build a new industry-led open standard and an assessment program that can demonstrate to integrators and acquirers of COTS ICT products that their providers are Trusted Technology ProvidersTM and who can demonstrate that they follow industry best practices in mitigating the threats of counterfeit and maliciously tainted products.

Yes! We need some experts...

atsec has been working closely with The Open Group Trusted Technology Forum (OTTF) since it began in late 2010. For the last three years we've been dedicating a great many hours, alongside our OTTF colleagues with representatives from providers, acquirers and assessors, all working together to progress an  industry vision for an open voluntary standard and an associated accreditation program for trusted technology in relation to supply chain security.

Together, the OTTF have worked very hard.

We developed and published a white paper, a snapshot of the standard, and the O-TTPS standard itself. We have collaborated, presented and harmonized.

We have looked for and found consensus amongst many key organizations. It took blood, sweat and tears!

• We worked with some of the major names in the I.T. industry for security assurance, including many of the major global players in the industry.
• We worked with governments around the world. 
• We worked amongst a time of change within (U.S.) government agencies.

Believe me, finding consensus in such a diverse and knowledgeable set of people was never going to be an easy task!

Finally, we have been working hard on an Accreditation Program and piloting the model in real world assessments. This way we had the chance to iron out some of the wrinkles before the accreditation program became public.

Well, the launch of the assessment program is finally here: February 3rd, 2014; three years after we began work. A short eternity perhaps, but an era that has demonstrated a great achievement.

As atsec worked with the pilots for the accreditation program we had the experience of training and qualifying our assessor teams in. We drew from those with experience in testing,evaluating and of course assessing. Here is a quote from Courtney Cavness, one of our process assessment experts:
"Working as an Assessor on this pilot was a tremendous learning experience. I enjoyed applying my previous audit/evaluation experience to this new standard to help refine and enhance both the standard and the accreditation program."

Another of our senior assessors, King Ables, said  that: 

"This important new standard fills a gap in the spectrum of assurance measures available to product developers and end users. As an early Recognized Assessor, atsec participated in a pilot assessment to "test drive" the standard. This pilot allowed us to gain practical experience with O-TTPS as well as to provide suggestions for improvements based on our other security assessment experience."

The new Accreditation Program, which has been running in pilot mode since last year, already has  one completed accreditation under its belt. An achievement not to be sneezed at!

atsec thanks IBM for the opportunity to participate in the pilot phase and for assigning some of their senior experts in the field to the project which helped the project go very smoothly. 

For a list of  completed and approved accreditations, and their scope's see The Open Group's accreditation register.

Well known and global Trusted Technology Providers have placed enough credence in the program to actively participate; and two respected assessor companies in the field of information assurance also invested in helping to develop and test the program and are the first "Recognized Assessors" working with The Open Group's O-TTPS independent Accreditation Authority to help providers "Build with Integrity" which then allows their acquirer and integrator customers to "Buy with Confidence."

With wide across-the-board participation in the OTTF, we heard a very important message: resources available for providing assurance are scarce and nobody wants to do or pay more than once for the same thing. I believe that the Accreditation Program has incorporated this requirement. It allows for appropriate re-use of assurance already gained.

The OTTF are continuing to work hard on this topic, forging appropriate alliances in the field of information security and information assurance.

Of course it remains to be seen if the program will engender enough trust and confidence to be useful assurance for those eager to have it, but so far all the indications are that it will.

Fiona Pattinson

O-TTPS Consensus!

It's always a heartening moment when the consensus of leading industry experts is reached. Achieving consensus is a process that can sometimes take years. A period in which world-class experts thought and "fought,"  researched, discussed, and drank a lot of coffee. Sometimes it seemed that consensus might never be achieved as the application of collective expertise and coordination of the many different "agendas" associated with a difficult and developing subject area were brought together to synthesize  a new industry norm.

We did it !

 

Thanks to the members of The Open Group Trusted Technology Forum (OTTF), the Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard  (O-TTPS)  has been published. A set of guidelines, requirements, and recommendations that address specific threats to the integrity of hardware and software Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products throughout the product life cycle.
Public News Release:

Threats of counterfeit and maliciously tainted products

After consulting with several key users of COTS ICT products it was apparent that the initial release of O-TTPS should address the worrying threats of maliciously tainted and counterfeit products. These two threats are identified as key threats to users of COTS ICT products which are often deployed in the world's critical infrastructures.

It is important to understand the O-TTPS definitions of these two terms as they are key to understanding the entire standard:

• Maliciously tainted product - the product is produced by the provider and is acquired through a provider’s authorized channel, but has been tampered with maliciously.
• Counterfeit product - the product is produced other than by, or for, the provider, or is supplied to the provider by other than a provider’s authorized channel and is presented as being legitimate even though it is not.

How does O-TTPS fit into a complete real-world supply chain?

Before you throw up your hands in horror at the observation that O-TTPS does not address everything to do with a complete real-world supply chain you should consider that no single standard can expect to address everything at once. The OTTF has and continues to work very closely with other organizations that focus on different views of the supply chain. The topic is large, complex and dynamic. To be successful, coordination from many viewpoints is extremely important. What is included in O-TTPS is coverage of the essential interfaces to both upstream and downstream entities which will allow for a chain of assurance to be built.

For example, downstream from the O-TTPS:

• NIST is drafting a special publication, NIST Special Publication 800-161, Supply Chain Practices for Federal Information Systems, which plans to address supply chain issues from the government acquirers viewpoint and relating it to the end-user viewpoint. The latter is already addressed in Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal information Systems and Organizations, and the supporting documents.
• ISO is working on related standards including ISO/IEC 27036, Information Security for Supplier Relationships, which will be a multi-part standard including sections titled Overview and Concepts, Common Requirements, Guidelines for ICT Supply Chain Security and Guidelines for Security of Outsourcing; all of which are currently under development in ISO's IT security techniques sub-committee (27).

Upstream from O-TTPS are a plethora of standards, both published and in the process of being drafted, which are appropriate to the gamut of industry segments, from aerospace to utilities. These are often very specialized and focused on particular technologies. As a single example, the NASPO standard addresses supply chain security issues related to security documents, such as passports, tamper labels, credit cards, money, and so on. 

The OTTF also identified and worked on the relationship to product and component certifications, such as Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, and others. These product security assurance standards already address some of the requirements identified in the O-TTPS and the OTTF has been working hard to discover where such existing assurance may be meaningfully reused.

O-TTPS does not promise total freedom from the existence of counterfeit or maliciously tainted products

Of course it would be ridiculous to think that it could! What O-TTPS does promise is that an organization which implements the requirements of O-TTPS will have reduced the risks associated with the threats of counterfeiting and maliciously tainted products or components.
The OTTF's trademarked tagline says it all:

"Build with integrity buy with confidence"TM

However, even with the development of standards and guidelines addressing this topic, the principle of "caveat emptor" must still apply.

About the O-TTPS

I'm not going to reproduce the standard here. It is freely available direct from The Open Group. Here I will give a very high level overview of what is included. Perhaps it will be enough to whet your appetite and encourage you to find out more about the O-TTPS.

The first sections introduce the standard, provide context and overview, precisely define the terms that are used, as well as describe the specific threats that the standard addresses. These are always the most important sections of a standard to read if you really expect to have a full understanding of how the standard is expected to work.

Next, the O-TTPS builds a framework upon which the various best practices for supply chain security (known as "requirements") are organized. All of the requirements given in the O-TTPS have been considered as contributing to countering the risks associated with the above threats.

The diagram below shows the O-TTPS defined Framework Model:

In the following diagram you can see how the requirements are identified and presented in O-TTPS framework.

What is next?

Currently the O-TTF is working on a proposed accreditation program for the standard. Such a program will allow organizations to demonstrate that they conform to the  requirements of the standard, and hence build products with integrity and as a consequence provide an opportunity for acquirers to buy with confidence.

Already some forward thinking acquirers have recommended the O-TTPS to their suppliers. This is a good sign for the future.