Showing posts with label Fiona Pattinson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fiona Pattinson. Show all posts

Friday, February 14, 2014

Some Efficiencies in the O-TTPS Accreditation Program


One of the nice things about working with the OTTF and The Open Group TM in developing their O-TTPS Accreditation Program has been the emphasis that the forum members placed on efficiency within the program.

One of the major gripes in the IT assurance community is that we seem to do the same things over and over again.

That costs us precious resources, people, money and time and was pointed out by many of the members of the OTTF.

Mary Ann Davidson of Oracle, as usual, expressed the problem very well: "Doing the same thing twice or more unintentionally usually ends up with worse security as we use scarce resources on duplicative measures."

For developers, how many times do they really have to get their processes checked to see if, for example, they use an automated configuration management system, and that they have implemented access control for it. Such checks are made over and over again if they need to certify products under a variety of assessment programs.

For some of our customers, we have checked this close to a hundred times over the last decade.

Using the above example, the checks are made if a product from the developer needs FIPS 140-2, Common Criteria, O-TTPS assessment, etc., etc. It's both inefficient and expensive for the developers.
These overlaps are prevalent and extend to many of the organizations' processes, not just to configuration management.

Similarly, for mature IA assessment companies like atsec, we find that all of the various programs that we are involved with demand that we have certified management systems. The problem is that there are a variety of standards and a variety of certification programs to choose from.

In atsec's case, this has meant that we have to, across our small company of less than 100 people, to manage, endure and pay for many management system audits; It is a cost of our doing business, but a real pain in the... .

We have:
  • ISO/IEC 17025: 2 for NVLAP (don't ask!), BSI, FMV, and by ISCCC;
  • Technical competence audits: CMVP, NIAP, GSA, BSI, CSEC, O-TTPS;
  • PCI SSC: (not based on international standard);
  • ISO 9001 (Customer demand);
  • ISO/IEC 27001  (Customer demand);
  • and soon to ISO/IEC 17020.
None of the our auditors are allowed to accept the results from the others. Granted, each scheme requires a different technical competence, but our document and record control, HR, training, resource management, corrective and preventive actions, internal audit, calibration, etc. are the same for all of the programs to which we belong.

atsec customers can be assured that our management system is well audited!


.. back to the O-TTPS Accreditation Program: 

The forum saw the chance to try and address this issue: The notion of carefully reusing existing assurance was one of the factors we considered during each stage of developing the new O-TTPS Accreditation Program.

Here are some of the efficiencies that we identified and that the Accreditation Program has implemented:
  • The ability for O-TTPS assessors to reuse existing audit reports presented by the developer. These might include, where relevant, ISO 9001, security audits, Common Criteria site visits, etc.
    Note that there are some careful provisions, which are detailed in the Assessment Procedures.
  • Currently under development: The provision of mappings, allowing the work done for existing product certifications, such as Common Criteria, to be more easily mapped to the O-TTPS requirements.
  • For prospective Recognized Assessor companies and assessors, the ability to accept a variety of existing certifications of management systems and assessor qualifications that address the core skills needed as information assurance (IA) professionals. This allows The Open Group to concentrate only on the additional specialised skills needed for the O-TTPS accreditation program.
Although simple policies, they allow the program to be more efficient, reducing the overhead of unnecessary duplication, meaning that the costs of accreditation are not overburdened. These reduce the costs of assessment, to all parties involved: The Accreditation Authority, the Recognized Assessors and to the Organizations undergoing accreditation.

Not only that, but we can concentrate more on the important issue of integrity in the COTS ICT Supply Chains.

Thank you to the OTTF for living in the real world! :)

~ Fiona Pattinson

- "The Open Group" is a trademark of The Open Group

Monday, September 30, 2013

A summary of the first ICMC:

The first ICMC is over.

It was a wonderful event and thanks are due to all of the 171 participants for making it so.
Participant Quote: "This conference is Win Win Win!"

These attendees represented developers, governments, laboratories, consultants,  and academics from the cryptographic module community.

ICMC 2013 sponsors
It turned out to be a truly international affair with people from organizations based in eighteen countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the U.K., and the United States of America.

Thanks are also due to the sponsors. A first conference is always a risk, and it would have been hard to make the conference a success without them.  

Thanks to Bill and Nikki from CNXTD who planned and supported us; arranging the hotel, providing registrations, communications, last minute schedule patches and the management of all those things that security experts are often bad at. CNXTD focus on planning conferences in the security field and have immense experience that showed!


About the conference

We already posted short summaries of each of the days including some of the photographs that we took.

Monday was the CMVP and accredited laboratories meeting. Many of us heard how much hard work that was, especially since they usually take at least three days to cover all of their business. This is a private meeting and as you might expect there are no public slides or links.

Tuesday was for workshops: These were very well attended, and my big surprise was how popular Steve Weingart's, "An introduction to FIPS 140-2" was. I had my doubts since almost everyone who signed up for the conference was an expert in the field. Silly me! Almost everyone I spoke to that had attended said they still learned something new! The quality of the other workshops on more specialised areas (physical security, side channel analysis and testing, and mobile security) were of a very high standard and provided excellent opportunities to learn more on these topics.

Wednesday and Thursday included the keynotes, policy/program related and technical  presentations and plenty of coffee breaks.

As the conference progressed we began to see some themes and memes emerge:

Credibility and Trust
Charles H. Romine

Although cryptographic modules are very important to security in government, critical infrastructure and commercial sectors, it is rare that anything to do with cryptographic modules and the validations of their conformance to standards become the subject of public and political attention. Usually this topic is reserved for the "boffins" i.e., it is a very technical topic only well understood and discussed by the policy and technical experts. For many end users the assurance they rely upon is based on the trust and credibility they hold in those specifying the assurance case on their behalf. In the U.S. that is NIST and the CMVP. For many years this has not been doubted in the slightest.


Surprise!!! 

In the weeks leading up to the conference this topic was headline news, not just within our small community, but it was discussed in the popular media around the world. Not just fame, but infamy. Oh my....

This truly vital topic was addressed by Charles H. Romine, Director of the Information Technology Laboratory at NIST who was a keynote speaker for ICMC. It is clear that NIST take this subject very seriously indeed and are taking appropriate action. Dr. Bertand du Castel also talked about trust from a non-governmental perspective.

The delays to the update of FIPS 140-2, and the length of time that developers must wait to be listed as conformant with the standard ("The Queue" is currently measured at several months) are also affecting the credibility of NIST. The conference participants asked that NIST listen to the community and take appropriate action on these topics too.  

The future of the FIPS specifications, ISO

FIPS 140-3 was bound to be a discussion topic. We heard, as we expected, that FIPS 140-3 is moribund. This has brought problems which are getting worse with time, not better. As technology moves on, and the pace of change increases, with no real update to the specification for a decade, FIPS 140-2 is creaking badly. To deal with this, the CMVP must issue Implementation Guidance (I.G.), which is now so complex that it is virtually impossible to understand all the nuances. We saw several presentations on the topic of several notorious implementation guidances, and even some more formal logical analysis of the I.G. themselves. My goodness, what have we created?...

We heard a lot of discussion and grievances in relation to this topic and we realised that at least part of the reason for the length of the queue is related to the I.G.:  Its (sometimes) retroactive applicability; its complexity; incomplete understanding and inconsistent application of the policies by validators, testers and developers.

There is some light at the end of the tunnel. We heard a lot about the ISO standards and supporting documents for cryptographic modules. How they have been developed by experts, and are now publishing the second revision, representing more recent technical improvements that have "leap-frogged" the FIPS specifications. We heard from several programs that are already using the standards in formal programs. including Japan, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. We heard of the iCMVP that is a memorandum of understanding between Japan and NIST in regard to the framework for accepting work done under each program. This may be a simplistic start when we look at the CC Recognition Arrangement, but it could, in time, grow to include other nations...

All we have to do is convince NIST and CSEC to adopt the ISO standards as national standards, and manage the transition.

The Queue

The length of "The Queue" was discussed during several sessions. This subject was at the front of everyone's minds as the CMVP, with limited resource, struggle to keep up with the number of validations, laboratory assessments, policy writing, as well as other assigned duties.

The current length of The Queue means that it can take developers many months to get their modules validated and hence available for procurement from federal agencies. In an increasing number of cases, products are obsolete or un-supported by the time the validation is finally documented. We heard how  the unpredictability of The Queue is a problem too, since it greatly affects  how developers can perform their marketing, sales and project planning.

We heard a lot more detail about the resource constraints under which the CMVP must operate, and by the end of the conference I believe everyone had a better understanding of why, and we even had some ideas on how to address this problem. These ranged from increased fees for service which would allow NIST to have more resources, sub-contracting validators to the NIST team, allowing labs and developers to work on appropriate topics that would make validation of the test reports easier  and more efficient, and discussion of the internal CMVP review process.

Entropy 

Captain Entropy:
conceived at the first ICMC

Another "hot" topic was entropy. We heard several papers related to entropy, including the philosophical,the mathematical and the practical. Earnest discussion of the subject  was continued throughout the evening by representatives of several of the accredited laboratories, which finally resulted in the conception of "Captain Entropy." We share the vision with you and hope that you can forgive both poor artistic skills and our making light of what really is a serious subject.




What's next?

During the final wrap up session we had a clear mandate from the participants to continue the ICMC conference next year, and also to champion the establishment of a "user group." The user group will seek active participation from all the stakeholders for the development, testing and validation of cryptographic modules. 

So please do not think it is all over for a year. This was the beginning and we have work to do together during the remainder of this year and in 2014.

atsec will continue to facilitate this, but we will be seeking active participation from all the stakeholder groups. We envisage something similar to the CC User's Forum and will initially use both the mailing list for ICMC 2013, the ICMC 2013 and FIPS 140-2 related LinkedIn groups to communicate how this will happen. Please help us spread the word.

Fiona Pattinson

Monday, September 9, 2013

The first week in Orlando

Last week we attended the CCUF meeting in Orlando. 

This meeting is co-located with the bi-annual CCDB meeting and co-locating them allows the two organizations the opportunity for cooperation. Both groups operate in closed session but for the CCMC the members are the CCRA nation representatives while the CCUF membership includes representatives from the whole community, including the national schemes. The two organizations also arranged for some joint “de-briefing” meetings.
 

In addition to the formal sessions, of course a lot of discussion also happens during the breaks, and for quite a few of us at the joint “(Un) Happy” hour.

Gossip, rumors, and innuendo are always prevalent when two groups with different objectives are juxtaposed. Here are a few from the week:

If only… “The atsec blog would go away”…  and … “Yay! for the atsec blog”  ;)


If only… We could solve the CCUF tea problem! 

A nice hot cup of teaTrivial? Perhaps this is a symptom; but how can the CCUF be a powerful organization if we don’t have a nice hot cup of tea? 

It's an important part of the process, accepted and enjoyed by the diverse peoples of many nations. Tea can be used to predict the future and, especially useful when discussing crypto topics, can also be used for  generating small amounts of finite improbability.

(I don’t know, perhaps the CCUF needs to be a legal entity before we can sponsor tea for ourselves?)

If only… The CCUF would represent the whole of the criteria-using community. Not just those working under one MRA (i.e., the CCRA) but also supporting those working under other mechanisms for applying the criteria such as SOGIS, commercial schemes, and even national applications – regardless of whether they use the CCDB’s CC or ISO/IEC 15408.

An observation from the Mobility Device working group: "The CCUF has just about zero direct representation from end users. This is fine (in theory) because the schemes may play the role of advocating for their end users. They don't here. At least, NIAP doesn't, who was clearly running this TC."



If only… “We’d started developing cPPs ten years ago. Using this process we would have an agreed PP for secure floppy disks ready for use very soon now.”

Does the CCMC realize that it takes at least 2-3 years for international organizations to achieve international consensus? While some TC's are being led to believe that once completed a PP can be approved in a few months (NIAP quoted 3-4 months from completion in the TC to publication during the MFP workshop today) the CCMC process can be expected to take much longer, with the complex national approvals and endorsements required by the formal process being developed as part of the USB TC. 


We must set expectations properly and communicate that in reality, following a formal process, it will take at least 5 years to produce a cPP.

In fact ISO’s JTC 1/SC 27 and the CCDB have an established special relationship, are we clever enough to leverage that relationship intelligently? Can we save some time?
 

If only… Key CCDB documents, such as the proposed new CCRA, could be open for CCUF members to review too. 
The CCUF has many very experienced members and offer potentially valuable contributions. Even though the CCUF will not be a signatory to the CCRA, the CCUF members are key stakeholders. 
Last week I heard from the MC chair that the new CCRA will be published without any review from the CCUF constituents. If these stakeholders have any issues, the CCMC may consider these for the next CCRA. – Wow!

If only… The good intentions, willingness to contribute and produce something good, enthusiasm and expertise that we find in the CCUF was not being eroded by confusing, changing, inconsistent policies, and delaying tactics from the CCMC.   
Here is one expression of opinion I heard: "There is not clear direction, everyone is concerned they will do work that won't be approved, and they constantly look around to see what others are doing to see if they comply with that, since there seems no clear directive on a way forward."
 
If only…  We understood the parameters and goals of the proposed iTC for “Apps on an OS.” That is obviously going to be one very busy iTC and will need some special management techniques.

By the way, is a virtualized OS also an “App on an OS” and will there be another sister iTC for “Apps not on an OS?”

Again, information on this proposal seems scanty, and I, for one, look forward to much more clarity from the CCMC on the scope of this item.


If only… The CCMC would adopt another message for the week other than “It is hard to co-ordinate 26 nations.” Yes, we got that. All the CCUF members I spoke with during the week agreed that it is hard to coordinate 26 nations.
Two points on this:

1. I would suggest that every time we hear this message next week we recall that some organizations have already worked this out, and have policies and procedures to deal with this problem in “reasonable” time-frames: Two examples: ISO (SC27 currently coordinates 68 nations) and ICAO (currently coordinates 191 nations). These organizations publish their procedures and it’s not easy for them either.
At least ISO’s JTC 1 process includes co-ordination with each national standards body. In turn many of these JTC 1 members include representatives from the vendor/developer community, whose expert contributions are solicited and respected.
Does the CCMC not try to learn from these mature organizations?

2. Developers working internationally also have to deal with this problem. They are selling products to a variety of national governments and have the unenviable task to understand the various regulations and policies of nations in order to develop and sell their products. That is not easy either.

If only… The CCMC paid attention to some of the project dependencies and communicated (estimated) time frames. Perhaps a simple Gantt chart might help the CCUF in their planning and coordination?
Example: New iTC’s cannot be formed until the iTC procedures and policies are complete, yet we seem to have already formed several TCs that may be put back at beginning once we know where the beginning is.


If only… The schemes paid proper attention to current weaknesses and threats.
Example: The Mobile PP requiring just TLS 1.0 rather than more recent versions that have been updated to address more recently identified weaknesses and threats.

(On this topic an interesting speculative blog article by Matthew Green, is here.) 

If only… The  national schemes would communicate between themselves more effectively.
Example: last week we heard from two major vendors in the OSPP workshops claim that a document containing "General-Purpose OS Cryptographic Requirements" had been provided to U.S. and Canadian evaluations back in April, but the OSPP pilot evaluation run by BSI has never been made aware of their existence, which shows some weird understanding of the cooperation in such pilot projects.


If only… There were no rumors…:
Next week we may find out if some are true…

  • A new certificate producing nation will be announced. (It is already announced on the CC Portal)
  • A new CCRA , as promised by the CCMC chair (this was announced at least a year ago in Paris) and the promise has been re-iterated this week.
  • Where will the conference be held next year?
  • Who is the missing Mickey?  

By Fiona Pattinson

    Monday, August 12, 2013

    Eulogy for the CCRA

    Friends, CCUF, countrymen, lend me your ears;

    Marc Antony
    I come to bury the CCRA, not to praise it.
    The evil that men do lives after them;
    The good is oft interred with their bones;
    So let it be with the CCRA. The noble David and Dag
    Hath told you the CCRA was ambitious:
    If it were so, it was a grievous fault,
    And grievously hath the CCRA answer'd it.
    Here, under leave of David and Dag and the rest--
    For David and Dag are honourable men;
    So are they all, all honourable men--
    Come I to speak in the CCRA's funeral.
    It was my friend, faithful and just to me:
    But David and Dag say it was ambitious;
    And David and Dag are honourable men.
    the CCRA hath brought many captives home to the CCMC.

    Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
    Did this in the CCRA seem ambitious?
    When that the poor have cried, the CCRA hath wept:
    Ambition should be made of sterner stuff:
    Yet David and Dag say it was ambitious;
    And David and Dag are honourable men.
    You all did see that at the ICCC,
    We twelve times presented kingly crowns in its name,
    Eighteen hundred times accepted. Was this ambition?
    Yet David and Dag say it was ambitious;
    And, sure, they are honourable men.
    I speak not to disprove what David and Dag spoke,
    But here I am to speak what I do know.
    You all did love the CCRA once, not without cause:
    What cause withholds you then, to mourn for it?
    O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts,
    And men have lost their reason. Bear with me;
    My heart is in the coffin there with the CCRA,
    And I must pause till it come back to me.


    The Tragedy of the CCRA
     - Sal la Pietra, Fiona Pattinson, 2013 
    With thanks to Mr. William Shakespeare,

    Tuesday, August 6, 2013

    How long is a piece of string?


    "How long is a piece of string?" is an English idiom; it is something that you say when someone asks you a question that you cannot answer about how big something is or how much time something will take.




    This was the phrase that came to mind when we saw the old, 2005,  NSTISSP#11 guidance from the CCEVS: "The goal established for low assurance products (i.e., EAL 1) is 30-90 days of evaluation time and will cost less than higher assurance (e.g., EAL4) evaluations."

    First, an important caveat: It seems that since 2005 at least, the NIAP have been leaders in the field to try and address the topic of providing timely information assurance, which is a problem that has also been expressed more widely within the CC community. So please do not see this blog as being focused particularly at NIAP. It is relevant to any scheme aiming to bound the length of an "evaluation." In fact, the very first key point in the CCMC's Vision Statement is: "The general security level of general ICT COTS certified products needs to be raised without severely impacting price and timely availability of these products."

    The issue of evaluations taking too long is a perennial problem that the CC community hopes to address together. Of course, the U.S. scheme is amongst the schemes represented in the community, and the NIAP are lucky enough to have their own national feedback in the form of reviews and studies that are part of the checks and balances in place in the U.S. For example, in 2006 the IDA published, "Review of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)."

    This report gave attention to efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. scheme and includes the statement: "Evaluation costs are too high and they take too long. These are common complaints, particularly from small businesses." The topic of appropriate metrics is pervasive throughout the report. In fact, just after that report was published, U.S. labs saw a flurry of activity from NIAP hoping to identify and establish appropriate measures, amongst them was the elapsed time for an evaluation project.

    This is an important metric, BUT it needs to be defined correctly and appropriately if it is to be useful.

    I contend that what NIAP really meant to say in their old NSTISSP#11 guidance was:

    "The goal established for low assurance products (i.e., EAL 1) is 30-90 days of validation time and will cost less than higher assurance (e.g., EAL4) evaluations."

    Consider that the evaluation portion of a project is the work undertaken by the lab in close cooperation with the vendor.  How long this takes depends on how you define "evaluation project."
    • For developers, it starts the moment they decide that they may need to perform a CC project.
    • For labs and consultants, it starts the moment a developer hires them.
    • For schemes, it starts when a project is formally "entering evaluation."


    Let's consider a typical project, identifying the following key "phases" of an evaluation project from the point of view of the sponsor of a project.

    1. Decision: The decision process when a vendor identifies the requirements for the "project:" factors include their target market and the associated requirements for CC compliance, which scheme to use, which national policies apply, identifying a laboratory and any needed consultancy, defining the TOE, and selecting appropriate PPs. Depending on prevalent policy, this phase may include the need to develop a suitable PP before a product can be evaluated.

    2. Review: A review of the product against the identified requirements, which is often made with a consultant. This may mean that organizational processes or product changes need to be made. The axiom, "the earlier in the cycle, the cheaper it is to fix" may well apply.

    3. Evaluation: The laboratory performs the evaluation. Currently some schemes are closely involved with this task. Oversight of the laboratory by the scheme is close. Other schemes identify particular checkpoints. (For example, NIAP's Validation Oversight Reviews (VOR), which is a type of formal technical review.)

    4. Validation: The scheme performs the validation of the lab's work. Historically this was performed hand-in-hand with the evaluation work performed by the lab. This phase usually includes discussion and negotiation of the technical and policy details and interpretations are issued and managed. Once the validator is satisfied, the process culminates with the issuance of a certificate.
    Here is a typical waterfall view. I don't for a moment think that any of the community runs projects like this! Notice that the timeline is in quarters of a year (i.e., 3 months). The durations given are typical, but in real life are dependent on many factors and can be much shorter or longer.


    So how are projects currently organized?

    Assuming that an appropriate PP exists,or is not specified, in atsec's experience we are used to seeing a model like this:

    For developers with complex international markets, the decision phase can be quite lengthy. Once the basic parameters are set, getting the consultants in early can help shorten the project and reduce some of the project risks. Some technologies or products are naturally more complex and take longer (the shaded areas in Evaluation and Validation). The "Review" phase can be significantly lengthened if this is the first time a developer's project team has performed a CC project, or if significant process or product changes are needed.

    One important point to remember is that one of the project dependencies is the availability of scheme (validator) resource. In the past, we have seen projects delayed in more than one scheme because of availability of scheme resources.

    What about schemes that require a PP that doesn't yet exist?

    NIAP have been demanding that the community write a PP first (and cPPs for the wider CC community are part of the Vision). As we know, developing a PP is a lengthy process. At the moment, it typically takes close to two years. Of course, as more and more PPs and cPPs become available, then this issue will reduce. The quality of the PP, and how much interpretation or guidance in its application is needed will affect all the subsequent projects.



    This scenario is adding huge costs to the developers, immensely extending the timeline for projects, and given the typical product life-cycle, means that for many newly issued certificates the related products are no longer current (a problem that already existed, but that this scenario exacerbates).

    Consider also that the real world is not so simple. For developers with a defined certification strategy, several projects may need to be coordinated and budgeted, and not just CC projects. When timescales can be variable, it can make program management very difficult indeed. 

    What will a defined validation period mean?

    Granted, at lower assurance and with improved processes, the time for evaluation will reduce. Of course we need to consider that for many of the developers that address international markets and must or want-to demonstrate higher assurance in the same project or run a NIAP project concurrently with other projects than the natural approach is to have the lab perform the evaluation ahead of the formal "entry" into the NIAP program. In effect, the NIAP's 90 days becomes an additional overhead as the participants strive to reduce the risk of last-minute surprises.

    So making such a mandate may do little more than add an extra 90 days to the schedule, reduce the involvement of the validator in the evaluation work, and increase project associated costs to the developer.

    An additional item for the efficiency of this model is the documentation, consistency and dissemination of any interpretations and policy changes. Without the developers and labs having access to a formal set of precedent rulings, prior adjudications and  interpretations, the validation phase will inevitably extend as a result and may result in confusion, inconsistent application of precedents and perhaps worse, inconsistent and even unfair evaluations. As new PPs are applied, then we find the need for interpretations, new policy and for potentially inconsistent applications inevitably increasing. Of course this may result in new versions of PPs, and the need to consider transition plans throughout the review and decision phases. For the "old" CC model of course we had the "interpretations" mechanism at both local and international levels, but for the new NIAP paradigm, many policies are not public, are disseminated to labs directly and may not even be formally and reliably fed back into the initiating technical community.




    Without existing PPs, as is currently the case for many developers,the project will take at least 3 years!


    What about the scheme metrics for the length of an evaluation?

    Well, it depends how the scheme defines what an "evaluation project" is.

    NIAP, like many schemes, define the start point as when an evaluation project is formally registered with the scheme.

    So, for the scheme, the measurement is often made from the time an application to the scheme occurs until the certificate is issued. The time is variable, but over the years many schemes have found the need to set limits. These limits have been imposed to address abuse. (For example, by using the official: "In evaluation" status as a substitute for the certificate when dealing with procurement requirements, or because a ridiculously long project consumes valuable scheme resources.) NIAP's new policy is to reduce the length of this phase of the project to 90 days.

    In order to meet such a timescale for the validation phase, the bulk of the evaluation work must be completed first. (It is the process of evaluation, or pre-evaluation that identifies all the inconsistencies that need to be cleared up in order to keep the "validation phase" to minimum length.)

    How smoothly a validation goes (and hence how fast it can be done) depends on the ability to engage with the scheme to allow project members to ask for interpretations, the fine details of policy, and so on, means that "surprises" at the end of the process can be forestalled. This is especially important when a model is used where the validation runs very quickly as a "check" at the end of the project. With the validator assigned at the beginning of the lab engagement, many questions and issues can easily be ironed out.

    Examples of this kind  of project model are adopted by many conformance testing programs. Let's use the CMVP (NIST's crypto module program) as an example.

    Look what happened! Here the final "validation" phase became the main variable in project length which, due to resource variability in the program, fluctuates; in recent years, between three and ten months. Could this be a lesson learned that CC schemes should pay attention to?



     

    Summary: Just how long is a piece of string?

    The answer is:
    • For the scheme, NIAP: 90 days. 
    • For the rest of the community it is the same length it was before, plus 90 days. 
    Thoughts, comments and feedback are welcome from the CC community.

    P.S. If you are interested in this topic, then I will highlight the accepted paper at ICCC this year by Courtney Cavness entitled: "Faster Evaluations: A Matter of Timing." Check the ICCC program for the abstract and timing.

    By Fiona Pattinson

    Monday, April 29, 2013

    Report on the work in ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 3 related to ISO/IEC 15408

    Last week I was once again privileged to be able to  join ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 3 during the latest of their bi-annual working sessions held in April and October.

    Convened by Miguel Bañón, this working group is of particular interest to atsec since it includes work on the international standards and guidance documents relating to ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 19790 and other documents closely related to evaluation and testing and the provision of assurance.

    I have written in more detail on these standards in:

    A little history on the relationship between ISO/IEC 15408 and the Common Criteria reveals that in the early 1990's, as the various national criteria , including Europe's ITSEC, The Canadian Criteria (CTCPEC) and the US Federal criteria, were brought together in order to create a single set of harmonized criteria, the intention was to publish the new set of "Common Criteria" as an ISO standard. A decision was made to create a more agile  technical community that could produce the work and present it to ISO. This was not done using the "PAS" process, but aimed to produce and submit  a substantially complete work that would allow expeditious instantiation of the work with the full involvement of the ISO community,which could then support the standard's future maintenance within ISO.

    Hence the CCDB and ISO established a close liaison relationship, the Common Criteria were submitted to ISO by the CCDB and the first edition of  ISO/IEC 15408 was published in December of 1999.  Since then the CCDB have continued to liaise with ISO enabling the content  ISO/IEC 15408 and the "Common Criteria" to remain synchronized. It's a two way relationship allowing for changes and innovations to be brought to WG 3, and vice versa.

    ISO brings to the table a breadth and depth of constituents far beyond that of the CCDB. SC 27 (Security Techniques) currently brings together 50 participating nations, a further 27 observing nation and is in liaison with many industry groups and standards organizations.
    (At the SC 27 level these currently include CCDB, CCETT, Cloud security alliance, ECBS, ENISA, EPC, ETSI, Ecma International, ISACA/ITGI, ISSEA, ITU, MasterCard, and Visa, and organizations in direct liaison with WG 3 include the CCDB, CSNISG, ENISA, FIRST, ISCI, ISA99, ITU-T, ISO SC 7, ISO SC 37, ISO TC 65/WG 10, ISO TC 247. TCG and The Open Group.)

    The various national bodies and liaison organizations represented in WG 3 work closely within their home fields to garner the participation of, and to  represent the interests of, their own constituents.

    The CCDB was initially comprised of representatives from those  countries contributing their own national criteria, today the CCDB is still a subset of  the  13 members of the CCRA certificate issuing signatory nations and development efforts  focus on the needs of the government agencies which they represent. From the perspective of commercial industry and the wider group of CCRA it is a closed group, a little disconcerting when you realize that at least in the U.S., the stated policy is to adopt COTS products as a means of making government systems, more timely and cost-effective  and the US government emphasizes the benefits of public-private partnership.

    What does this mean in practice? WG 3 have focused on the open development of supporting standards and guidance. My earlier blogs detailed much of the work the WG 3 has established or that in progress. During  our  last WG 3 meeting  we heard from both The Open Group Real Time Embedded Systems forum and from our hosts at ETSI that work on High-assurance is an important topic to them and so WG 3 has initiated a study period on High-assurance - asking for contributions on this topic from it's national bodies and liaison organizations. WG 3 is also calling for contributions on the study period for predictive assurance, in which we hope to  understand the needs of industry and the  nations for this important topic.

    As a result of  our last meeting WG 3:
    • Proposed a new work item - A Catalogue of Architectural and Design Principles for Secure products, Systems and Applications 
    • Resolved  to revise the existing standard ISO/IEC 19791: Security assessment of operational systems in the light of progress that has been made in the few years since it was published and expected findings from the study of predictive assurance
    • Resolved to send the final corrigenda for  ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 for ballot by the ISO members. (These corrections to the standards reflect the changes that were introduced by Common Criteria V3.1 release 4.)
    • Initiated a study period on high-assurance
    • Extended the study period on predictive assurance
    If you are interested in contributing to these or other developments within SC 27 then you can do so either through your national body, or through one of the liaison organizations to SC 27.

    By, Fiona Pattinson

    Tuesday, April 9, 2013

    O-TTPS Consensus!

    It's always a heartening moment when the consensus of leading industry experts is reached. Achieving consensus is a process that can sometimes take years. A period in which world-class experts thought and "fought,"  researched, discussed, and drank a lot of coffee. Sometimes it seemed that consensus might never be achieved as the application of collective expertise and coordination of the many different "agendas" associated with a difficult and developing subject area were brought together to synthesize  a new industry norm.


    We did it !

     
    Thanks to the members of The Open Group Trusted Technology Forum (OTTF), the Open Trusted Technology Provider Standard  (O-TTPS)  has been published. A set of guidelines, requirements, and recommendations that address specific threats to the integrity of hardware and software Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products throughout the product life cycle.
    Public News Release:

    Threats of counterfeit and maliciously tainted products

    After consulting with several key users of COTS ICT products it was apparent that the initial release of O-TTPS should address the worrying threats of maliciously tainted and counterfeit products. These two threats are identified as key threats to users of COTS ICT products which are often deployed in the world's critical infrastructures.

    It is important to understand the O-TTPS definitions of these two terms as they are key to understanding the entire standard:
    • Maliciously tainted product - the product is produced by the provider and is acquired through a provider’s authorized channel, but has been tampered with maliciously.
    • Counterfeit product - the product is produced other than by, or for, the provider, or is supplied to the provider by other than a provider’s authorized channel and is presented as being legitimate even though it is not.

    How does O-TTPS fit into a complete real-world supply chain?

    Before you throw up your hands in horror at the observation that O-TTPS does not address everything to do with a complete real-world supply chain you should consider that no single standard can expect to address everything at once. The OTTF has and continues to work very closely with other organizations that focus on different views of the supply chain. The topic is large, complex and dynamic. To be successful, coordination from many viewpoints is extremely important. What is included in O-TTPS is coverage of the essential interfaces to both upstream and downstream entities which will allow for a chain of assurance to be built.

    For example, downstream from the O-TTPS:
    • NIST is drafting a special publication, NIST Special Publication 800-161, Supply Chain Practices for Federal Information Systems, which plans to address supply chain issues from the government acquirers viewpoint and relating it to the end-user viewpoint. The latter is already addressed in Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal information Systems and Organizations, and the supporting documents.
    • ISO is working on related standards including ISO/IEC 27036, Information Security for Supplier Relationships, which will be a multi-part standard including sections titled Overview and Concepts, Common Requirements, Guidelines for ICT Supply Chain Security and Guidelines for Security of Outsourcing; all of which are currently under development in ISO's IT security techniques sub-committee (27).
    Upstream from O-TTPS are a plethora of standards, both published and in the process of being drafted, which are appropriate to the gamut of industry segments, from aerospace to utilities. These are often very specialized and focused on particular technologies. As a single example, the NASPO standard addresses supply chain security issues related to security documents, such as passports, tamper labels, credit cards, money, and so on. 

    The OTTF also identified and worked on the relationship to product and component certifications, such as Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, and others. These product security assurance standards already address some of the requirements identified in the O-TTPS and the OTTF has been working hard to discover where such existing assurance may be meaningfully reused.

    O-TTPS does not promise total freedom from the existence of counterfeit or maliciously tainted products


    Of course it would be ridiculous to think that it could! What O-TTPS does promise is that an organization which implements the requirements of O-TTPS will have reduced the risks associated with the threats of counterfeiting and maliciously tainted products or components.
    The OTTF's trademarked tagline says it all:

    "Build with integrity buy with confidence"TM

    However, even with the development of standards and guidelines addressing this topic, the principle of "caveat emptor" must still apply.

    About the O-TTPS

    I'm not going to reproduce the standard here. It is freely available direct from The Open Group. Here I will give a very high level overview of what is included. Perhaps it will be enough to whet your appetite and encourage you to find out more about the O-TTPS.

    The first sections introduce the standard, provide context and overview, precisely define the terms that are used, as well as describe the specific threats that the standard addresses. These are always the most important sections of a standard to read if you really expect to have a full understanding of how the standard is expected to work.

    Next, the O-TTPS builds a framework upon which the various best practices for supply chain security (known as "requirements") are organized. All of the requirements given in the O-TTPS have been considered as contributing to countering the risks associated with the above threats.

    The diagram below shows the O-TTPS defined Framework Model:


    In the following diagram you can see how the requirements are identified and presented in O-TTPS framework.

    What is next?

    Currently the O-TTF is working on a proposed accreditation program for the standard. Such a program will allow organizations to demonstrate that they conform to the  requirements of the standard, and hence build products with integrity and as a consequence provide an opportunity for acquirers to buy with confidence.

    Already some forward thinking acquirers have recommended the O-TTPS to their suppliers. This is a good sign for the future.

    Monday, November 26, 2012

    ISO's work related to The Common Criteria

    Updated November 9th, 2016

    In 1990  ISO/IEC JTC 1 sub committee 27 was formed in order to deal with ICT security, Not long afterwards SC 27 initiated Working Group 3 "Security Evaluation Criteria". This working group focuses on security evaluation, testing and specification. 

    At that time, Common Criteria was in development and the need to have these standards internationally recognised was an important point of the strategy. The goal, which has been achieved, was that the standards should be available to the world, regardless of the formal Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement which was the formal arrangement between nations.

    SC27's business plan mentions that "The CCDB and SC 27/WG 3 have had a long-standing technical liaison on projects related to IT Security Evaluation Criteria. Thus, Working Group 3 has been working in close co-operation with the CCDB on the development of the Common Criteria, which has been simultaneously published as ISO/IEC 15408. The co-operation has been extended to also involve the work on 18045 “Evaluation methodology for IT security”.

    This liaison allows ISO's member national bodies, especially those not represented directly in the CCDB, an opportunity to review, comment and contribute to the project. In many cases it also provides a vehicle for industry experts from the commercial sector (vendor) community to have a place to contribute more directly.


    Both ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 3 and the CCDB produce supporting documents, those produced by the CCDB are listed on the CC portal at the bottom of the supporting publications page and cover smartcard and IC technology as well as documents directly related to supporting the CCRA.
       
    Additional documents related to ISO/IEC 15408 produced by WG 3 are described below.

    2016 Study Period on Information Assurance

    2016: The Study Period, which has been run by ISO, in close liaison with the CCDB, in regard to determining appropriate future developments of ISO/IEC 15408, ISO/IEC 18045 and other IT Assurance standards closed after a year. 

    The Fall  2016 WG 3 meeting enjoyed a summary of the two calls for comments and the rapporteurs presented a proposal for revising the ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 standards, as well as proposing some changes to the structure of ISO/IEC 15408.

    The proposed changes are shown in the diagram below. They include the specification of two new parts to ISO/IEC 15408 and an additional document that will be guidance supporting the transition and explaining the changes to the standard.




     

    Evaluation criteria and Methodology for IT security evaluation

    These are the "equivalent standards" to those published by the CCDB on the CC Portal. Minor revisions of the CC standards are usually addressed in ISO through the publication of corrigenda.

    These ISO standards are available from ISO for free (as in beer). The first three are equivalent to the first three parts of the CC, the fourth in the list is the equivalent of the CEM.

    ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009: Evaluation criteria for IT security -- Part 1: Introduction and general model

    ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008: Evaluation criteria for IT security -- Part 2: Security functional components

    ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008: Evaluation criteria for IT security -- Part 3: Security assurance components

    ISO/IEC 18045:2008: Methodology for IT security evaluation

    Developing security and privacy functional requirements based on ISO/IEC 15408

    ISO/IEC TS 19608: Guidance for developing security and privacy functional requirements based on ISO/IEC 15408

    This Technical Report provides guidance for developing privacy functional requirements as extended components based on privacy principles defined in ISO/IEC 29100 through the paradigm described in ISO/IEC 15408-2, for selecting and specifying Security Functional Requirements from ISO/IEC 15408-2 to protect Personally Identifiable Information and to specify a procedure to define both privacy and security functional requirements in a coordinated manner.
     2016/11: This new Technical Specification is currently being published by ISO.

    Guidance for the production of Protection Profiles and Security Targets

    ISO/IEC TR 15446: Guide for the production of Protection Profiles and Security Targets

    This technical report provides much needed guidance to PP authors and ST writers. Although ISO/IEC 15408-1 provides the technical information about writing a PP or an ST, The member nations of ISO supported that some practical guidance in writing these documents was needed and that this work should be completed. 

    2016/11: The third edition of ISO/IEC 15446 is currently being published by ISO. 

    Security assessment of operational systems

    ISO/IEC TR 19791: Security assessment of operational systems.

    ISO/IEC TR 19791:2010 provides guidance and criteria for the security evaluation of operational systems. It provides an extension to the scope of ISO/IEC 15408 by taking into account a number of critical aspects of operational systems not addressed in ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation. The principal extensions that are required address evaluation of the operational environment surrounding the target of evaluation, and the decomposition of complex operational systems into security domains that can be separately evaluated.
    ISO/IEC TR 19791:2010 provides:
    1. a definition and model for operational systems;
    2. a description of the extensions to ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation concepts needed to evaluate such operational systems;
    3. a methodology and process for performing the security evaluation of operational systems;
    4. additional security evaluation criteria to address those aspects of operational systems not covered by the ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation criteria.
    ISO/IEC TR 19791:2010 permits the incorporation of security products evaluated against ISO/IEC 15408 into operational systems evaluated as a whole using ISO/IEC TR 19791:2010.
    ISO/IEC TR 19791:2010 is limited to the security evaluation of operational systems and does not consider other forms of system assessment. It does not define techniques for the identification, assessment and acceptance of operational risk.

    This document was initially produced as a technical report with the goal of gaining experience in the subject sufficient to be able to codify a standard. It defines extensions to ISO/IEC 15408 in order to enable the security assessment (evaluation) of operational systems. Since ISO/IEC 15408, does not capture certain critical aspects of an operational system that must be precisely specified in order to effectively evaluate such a system. 

    The contents are fairly exhaustive with discussions of
    • The technical approach to operational systems assessment used in this Technical Report.
    • The extension of ISO/IEC 15408 evaluation concepts for use in operational system evaluation.
    • The relationship between this Technical Report and other security standards which have been used in its development.
    • requirements for specification of security problems, security objectives, security requirements, SST contents and periodic reassessment which are needed in order to evaluate operational systems.
    Annexes provide further supportive material including operational system:
    • Security Targets and System Protection Profiles, which defines the security requirement specifications needed for operational systems.
    • Functional control requirements, which defines the additional security functional requirements needed for operational systems
    • Assurance requirements, which defines the additional security assurance requirements needed for operational systems.
    • evaluation methodology, which defines additional actions to be performed by an evaluator conducting the evaluation of an operational system.
    This TR has been used in practice, with an early trial evaluation being reported from Japan.

    Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators

    DRAFT ISO/IEC TR 19896-1: Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators: Part 1: Introduction, concepts and general requirements.

    Provides the fundamental concepts related to the topic of the competence of the individuals responsible for performing IT product security evaluations and conformance testing. Provides the framework and the specialised requirements that specify the minimum competence of individuals performing IT product security evaluation and conformance testing using established standards.
    This will support the goals of ISO CASCO conformity assessment by contributing standardized requirements for competency supporting ISO/IEC 17024.

    DRAFT ISO/IEC TR 19896-3: Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators: Part 3: Knowledge, skills and effectiveness requirements for ISO/IEC 15408 evaluator.

    Provides the specialised requirements to demonstrate competence of individuals in performing IT product security evaluations in accordance with ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

    Vulnerability analysis and penetration testing for ISO/IEC 15408

    ISO/IEC TR 20004-1:2016: Refining software vulnerability analysis under ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045

    ISO/IEC TR 20004-2:Detailing software penetration testing under ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 vulnerability analysis

    Vulnerability Handling

    ISO/IEC 30111  Vulnerability handling processes 

    Describes processes for vendors to handle reports of potential vulnerabilities in products and online services. It is related to ISO/IEC 29147. It interfaces with elements described in ISO/IEC 29147 at the point of receiving potential vulnerability reports, and at the point of distributing vulnerability resolution information.This standard takes into consideration the relevant elements of ISO/IEC 15408-3, 13.5 Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR).

    ISO/IEC 29147 Vulnerability disclosure

    Gives guidelines for the disclosure of potential vulnerabilities in products and online services. It details the methods a vendor should use to address issues related to vulnerability disclosure.  This standard
    1. provides guidelines for vendors on how to receive information about potential vulnerabilities in their products or online services,
    2. provides guidelines for vendors on how to disseminate resolution information about vulnerabilities in their products or online services,
    3. provides the information items that should be produced through the implementation of a vendor's vulnerability disclosure process, and
    4. provides examples of content that should be included in the information items.
    ISO/IEC 29147 has recently been published and is currently available for free.

    Biometrics 

    Delving into technology specific areas of evaluation, biometrics were seen by the community as an area in need of standardization. So far WG 3 has produced two standards in this area.

    ISO/IEC 19792 Security evaluation of biometrics

    Relevant to both evaluator and developer communities as it addresses biometric-specific aspects and principles to be addressed during a security evaluation of a biometric system.
    It does not address the non-biometric aspects which might form part of the overall security
    evaluation of a system using biometric technology (e.g. requirements on databases or communication channels).
    Neither does this standard aim to define any concrete methodology for the security evaluation of biometric systems but instead focuses on the principal requirements. 

    As such, the requirements in this International Standard are independent of any evaluation or certification scheme and will need to be incorporated into and adapted before being used in the context of a concrete scheme. The standard includes:
    • an overview of all terms, definitions and acronyms used,
    • an introduction of the overall concept for a security evaluation of a biometric system,
    • a description of the statistical aspects of security-relevant error rates,
    • vulnerability assessment of biometric systems and
    • the evaluation of privacy aspects.

     ISO/IEC 24745: Biometric information protection

    Provides guidance for the protection of biometric information under various requirements for confidentiality, integrity and renewability/revocability during storage and transfer. Additionally, ISO/IEC 24745 provides requirements and guidelines for the secure and privacy-compliant management and processing of biometric information. ISO/IEC 24745 specifies the following:
    • analysis of the threats to and countermeasures inherent in a biometric and biometric system application models;
    • security requirements for secure binding between a biometric reference and an identity reference;
    • biometric system application models with different scenarios for the storage of biometric references and comparison; and
    • guidance on the protection of an individual's privacy during the processing of biometric information.
    ISO/IEC 24745: does not include general management issues related to physical security, environmental security and key management for cryptographic techniques.

    DRAFT IS 19989-1: Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems: Part 1: Framework

    DRAFT IS 19989-2: Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems: Part 2: Biometric recognition performance

    DRAFT IS 19989-3: Criteria and methodology for security evaluation of biometric systems: Part 3: Presentation attack detection

    Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408

    DRAFT ISO/IEC  TR 20543:Test and analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408.

    Physically unclonable functions (PUFs)

    DRAFT: ISO/IEC  20897:Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for physically unclonable functions (PUFs) for generating non-stored security parameters

    Cryptographic Protocols 

    IS 29128: Verification of cryptographic protocols: 

    Establishes a technical base for the security proof of the specification of cryptographic protocols. It specifies design evaluation criteria for these protocols, as well as methods to be applied in a verification process for such protocols. It also provides definitions of different protocol assurance levels consistent with evaluation assurance components in ISO/IEC 15408.

    Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements

    ISO/IEC  30104:2015 Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements

    This technical report provides guidance and addresses the following topics:
    • a survey of physical security attacks directed against different types of hardware embodiments including a description of known physical attacks, ranging from simple attacks that require little skill or resource, to complex attacks that require trained, technical people and considerable resources;
    • guidance on the principles, best practices and techniques for the design of tamper protection mechanisms and methods for the mitigation of those attacks; and
    • guidance on the evaluation or testing of hardware tamper protection mechanisms and references to current standards and test programs that address hardware tamper evaluation and testing.

    Secure System Engineering

    ISO/IEC TS 19249: Catalogue of Architectural and Design Principles for Secure Products, Systems, and Applications

    Provides a catalogue of architectural and design principles that can be used in the development of secure products, systems, and applications together with guidance on how to use those principles effectively. Each architectural and design principle is described using a common structure, identifying the purpose and advantage of the design principle, how it can contribute to develop a secure product, system, or application, its dependency on other principles described in the catalogue.

    Examples are provided for each principle on how it may be implemented, how it may contribute to security properties and functions and what other aspects have to be taken into account in the example provided to also address non-security related requirements like usability and performance.

    It gives guidelines for the development of secure products, systems and applications and is aiming for a more effective assessment with respect to the security properties they are supposed to implement.

    ISO/IEC TS 19249 is related to IS 15408 and IS 18045 and addresses both developers and evaluators of secure products, systems, and applications.

    This Technical Specification does not establish any requirements for the evaluation or the assessment process or implementation.

    ISO/IEC TR 29193: Secure system engineering principles and techniques

    This  technical report, ISO/IEC TR 29193 offers guidance on secure system engineering for Information and Communication Technology systems or products, and emphasizes security engineering aspects within the scope of the development stages of the system lifecycle described in ISO/IEC 15288.

    Drawing on the notion that it is better to build a system or product securely in the first place than to spend much resource after its instantiation this technical report begins to offer guidance on how the use of these principles and techniques will support a system engineering process to obtain results consistent with the system security characteristics and objectives determined for the ICT system or product. 

    ISO/IEC 21827:2008: Systems Security Engineering -- Capability Maturity Model® (SSE-CMM®). 

    This standard was submitted through the Publicly Available Specification (PAS) process by ISSEA and remains in the ISO catalogue.

    ISO/IEC 15443  ("FRITSA")

    ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2012:  Security assurance framework -- Part 1: Introduction and concepts

    ISO/IEC TR 15443-2:2012: Security assurance framework -- Part 2: Analysis

    Substantially revised in 2012. Part one gives a discussion of the nature of security assurance, providing a framework for further discussions and documents. Part 2 of this technical report describes the "criteria for criteria". It discusses security assurance schemes, and how these themselves can be evaluated. While some schemes are of high quality, others may not be. What criteria can be used to tell?

    Study Period on the Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for White Box Cryptography (WBC).

    WG 3 is currently investigating the above topic.




    ~By Fiona Pattinson.